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 Abstract 
In this paper, we examine a 30-year period to find whether vice (defined as operations in the 
alcohol, tobacco, gambling, adult services, and weapons and defense industries) plays a role in 
determining returns of individual firms on the U.S. stock market. We find no evidence that vice can 
be expected to affect returns, but rather that expected effects from vice are priced by other factors. 
However, our analysis does not lead us to conclude that either of the examined risk factors explain 
the variability in our vice factor. Furthermore, we examine whether vice stocks are associated with 
a premium. We are not able to conclude that such a premium exists.  
 
Keywords: Vice stocks, asset pricing, risk premiums, Fama and MacBeth 
 
JEL Classifications: G11, G12 
 
  
 Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 3 
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 5 
II. Theoretical framework .............................................................................................................................. 8 
III. Data ....................................................................................................................................................... 11 
1. Price data ............................................................................................................................................. 11 
2. Risk factors and the risk-free rate ........................................................................................................ 12 
IV. Method .................................................................................................................................................. 12 
1. Creating the vice factor ....................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Portfolios ....................................................................................................................................... 15 
1.2 Construction of the factor .............................................................................................................. 18 
2. Testing for multicollinearity ................................................................................................................ 19 
3. Fama and MacBeth regressions ........................................................................................................... 19 
V. Results .................................................................................................................................................... 21 
1. Multicollinearity and interplay between factors .................................................................................. 21 
2. Fama and MacBeth Regressions ......................................................................................................... 24 
2.1 Time Series Regressions................................................................................................................ 24 
2.2 Cross-Sectional Regressions ......................................................................................................... 24 
VI. Robustness............................................................................................................................................. 26 
1. Examining market betas ...................................................................................................................... 26 
VII. Analysis ............................................................................................................................................... 26 
VIII. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................ 29 
IX. References ............................................................................................................................................. 30 
X. Appendices ............................................................................................................................................. 32 
Appendix A: Description of risk factors ................................................................................................. 32 
Appendix B: Vice firms .......................................................................................................................... 34 
Appendix C: Virtue firms ........................................................................................................................ 36 
 5 
 
I. Introduction 
Judging by the level and growth of assets under management (AUM) according to responsible 
investing principles, it appears as sustainable development, corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
and environmental awareness have become important parts of all aspects of business. AUM 
according to responsible investing principles reached $8.7 trillion in 2016, and the figure had been 
rising. Approximately 1 out of every 5 dollars under professional management in the United States 
are invested using socially responsible investment (SRI) principles.1 This phenomenon could bring 
about a significant change in finance – where the goal of maximizing return on investment (ROI) 
must be aligned with an increased focus on sustainable practices. This could have implications for 
the pricing of stock in firms not deemed to be responsible. In this paper, we examine whether vice 
stocks (defined as stocks in firms with operations in the alcohol, tobacco, adult services, gambling, 
and weapons and defense industries) have become undervalued and have a premium. We also 
attempt to find if vice plays a role in determining individual stock prices. Our research is made up 
from a) testing whether effects of vice are explained by other risk factors, b) researching vice 
premia using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. We find no evidence that vice can be expected 
to affect returns, but rather, that expected effects from vice are priced by other factors. Neither do 
we find evidence of an existing vice premium. 
 
Fama and French (2007) discuss the consequences of pursuing non-financial goals while investing 
in the stock market. They address the illogicality of the assumption that investors pursue only 
financial goals while investing in the stock market. Fama and French (2007) also imply that 
investors who reject vice stocks for non-financial reasons tend to overweight SRI-focused firms in 
their portfolio. In turn, this could mean a risk of having an undiversified portfolio and therefore 
lower risk-adjusted returns. There are, however, studies showing that responsible investing does 
not necessarily mean lower returns. Auer (2016) shows that for the European stock market, using 
SRI screening does not mean financial underperformance. In fact, it seems possible to outperform 
the market using SRI investing. Also, Hill et al. (2007) show that corporate social responsibility 
                                                          
1 US SIF – 2016 Report on Sustainable and Responsible Investing Trends. 
 6 
 
(CSR) seems to be able to have a positive impact on firm value over a long-term horizon for U.S., 
European, and Asian companies.   
 
The definition of a vice stock is not completely straightforward, and many alternatives have been 
proposed, as described by Fauver and McDonald (2014). They explain that perceptions of vice 
differ across cultures, religions, and even geographical areas. For example, the authors mention 
that alcohol is regarded as highly sinful in Saudi culture, while tobacco is not. Furthermore, in their 
analysis of the G20 countries, with its diverse composition of nations, they conclude that firms may 
have different valuations in different markets. Their finding is that a higher level of perceived vice 
means a lower valuation in the local markets. There is also a time aspect to be considered, since 
the perception of what is regarded as a vice is not constant over time.  
 
Throughout this paper, we define a vice stock as stock in a firm with operations in one or several 
of the following industries: tobacco, alcohol, adult services, gambling, and weapons and defense. 
This follows directly from the classification used by Fabozzi et al. (2008) with the exception that 
we do not include the biotech sector in our analysis. As pointed out by Fauver and McDonald 
(2014), many nations regard this industry as highly important for the future (South Korea being 
one example) and not as a vicious industry.  
 
There is research supporting that investing in vice stocks increases the returns in a portfolio. For 
example, Fabozzi et al. (2008) show that vice stock portfolios outperform benchmark portfolios in 
35 out of 37 years examined. Similarly, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) have concluded that 
investors, including pension funds, lower their returns by excluding vice stocks from their 
portfolios. Their paper, however, utilizes a narrower definition of vice, and only include the 
alcohol, tobacco, and gambling industries in their samples. Chong, Her, and Phillips (2006) 
examine the performance of a mutual fund with a broad vice stock focus2 in comparison with a 
mutual fund with a focus on SRI.3 During a three-year period, the vice-focused fund outperformed 
both the S&P 500 Index and the SRI fund. 
 
                                                          
2 The USA Mutuals Vice Fund 
3 The Domini Impact International Equity Fund 
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Other research casts doubt on the potential of vice stocks to generate superior returns. In a study 
by Durand, Koh and Tan (2013), where seven pacific countries in Asia and Oceania are examined, 
the conclusion is made that sin stocks performed worse than the markets in all of the seven 
countries. Areal, Cortez and Silva (2013) examine how the USA Mutuals Vice Fund performs in 
comparison to a collection of funds focused on socially responsible investing (SRI). Special focus 
is placed on examining different periods of low and high volatility. Using the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) and the Carhart (1997) Four-Factor Model, they show that the vice fund does in 
fact perform worse than the SRI funds during periods of high volatility, which is contradictory to 
the claim of the Vice Fund’s managers that it should perform better during recessions. In a paper 
by Lobe and Walkshäusl (2016)4, separate portfolios with vice and SRI stocks are constructed. 
Using the vice portfolio as a long position, and the virtue portfolio as a short position, a hedge is 
formed. Analyzing this hedge with the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Model, 
the three-factor model by Chen et al. (2010), and the Carhart (1997) Four-Factor Model, they find 
the hedge to be inefficient in generating returns that outperform those of the market. They do, 
however, show that vice stocks have a lower market beta than virtue stocks, indicating a lower 
market risk for vice. Our research is differentiated from this paper in that we a) exclude the CAPM 
and the Chen et al. (2010) three-factor model, and include the Fama and French (2015) Five-Factor 
Model, b) construct our vice and virtue portfolios from firms in different industries, c) perform 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, d) use a longer time frame, e) utilize a sliding window 
approach. 
 
We base the analysis in this paper on the hypothesis that investors can outperform the market by 
investing in vice stocks. This leads us to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Vice stocks carry a premium 
The intuition behind our hypothesis is that an increased focus on responsible investing would lead 
to systematic divestment from sin stocks, which should cause said stocks to become undervalued 
in relation to their economic fundamentals. This undervaluation would give vice stocks a higher 
expected return – a premium. If the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), as formulated by Fama 
                                                          
4 This paper came to our attention just at the end of our own research. 
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(1970) is assumed to be valid, we should not be able to find that vice stocks are undervalued, since 
they would already be fairly priced. For example, an increased focus on sustainable practices could 
mean declining real demand for products and services offered by vice firms. Divestment for such 
reasons would not lead to undervaluation per se, but rather the fair price being driven down. 
 
While there are plenty of earlier papers examining this by comparing the returns of vice stocks with 
virtue stocks (Chong, Her, and Phillips, 2006; Areal, Cortez and Silva, 2013; Lobe and Walkshäusl, 
2016) and the broader markets (Fabozzi et al., 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2014; Durand, Koh 
and Tan, 2013), there is limited research on whether vice, in and of itself, can be used to explain 
returns in individual firms. This is the driver of our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Vice can be used to explain the stock returns of individual firms 
We reason that if vice, as such, is assumed to affect the behavior (that is, how securities are being 
bought and sold) of investors in the markets, then it can also be assumed to affect the prices of 
individual assets.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II lays down the foundation and the 
theoretical framework of our paper. Section III describes our data and its delimitations. Section IV 
shows the methodology of our research. Section V reports the main findings of our study. Section 
Section VI contains a check on robustness. VII consists of our analysis of the findings, as well as 
a discussion of the limitations to our methodology. Finally, section VIII concludes the paper.  
II. Theoretical framework  
The theoretical foundation of our research stems from models described by Fama and French 
(1992, 1993, 2015), and Carhart (1997). These papers present risk factor models that can be used 
to explain the return of individual stocks. Our analysis of returns draws directly upon each of the 
three models that are described in these papers. The models are summarized below: 
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Fama and French (1993) Three-Factor Model (FF3): 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, 
 
Carhart (1993) Four-Factor Model (CAR): 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, 
 
Fama and French (2015) Five Factor Model (FF5): 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡, 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the monthly stock excess return at time t, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the market excess return at time t 
over the one-month Treasury bill rate, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is a measure of the difference, on average, in returns 
at time t between small and big firms, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is a measure of the difference, on average, in returns 
at time t between firms with high and low book-to-market equity, 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is a measure of the 
difference, on average, in returns at time t between firms with positive and negative momentum, 
𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is a measure of the difference, on average, in returns at time t between firms with robust 
and weak operating profits, 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is a measure of the difference in average returns at time t between 
firms with conservative and aggressive investment strategies. A detailed description of each factor 
is provided in Appendix A. 
 
The rationale behind these factors are that small firms earn better returns than large firms, and that 
a similar relationship exists between firms with high and low book-to-market equity, robust and 
weak operating profits, firms with a positive stock price trend and a negative momentum5 and 
conservative and aggressive investment policies. Therefore, each of the factors essentially consists 
of both a long position (in firms with low market capitalizations, high book-to-market equity, 
positive momentum, robust operating profits, and conservative investments) and a short position 
(for firms with the opposite characteristics). Our justification for analyzing three separate models 
                                                          
5 Defined as the 12-month stock price trend. 
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is that we want to examine the interplay between vice and different sets of other risk factors, as to 
make our analysis more complete.  
 
In a 1973 paper, Fama and MacBeth devise a straightforward method of finding the premium for 
any risk factor. The Fama and MacBeth regressions consists of a two-step procedure. The first step 
is to estimate a time series regression for each asset or portfolio, where individual asset or portfolio 
returns are regressed on suggested risk factors. The second step is to estimate one cross-sectional 
regression for each time period, where all asset or portfolio returns are regressed on factor 
coefficients collected from the first step. The two steps, applied to FF3, CAR, and FF5 are 
summarized below: 
 
First step of the Fama and MacBeth regression, for each of our models: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
The second step of the Fama and MacBeth regression, for each of our models: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾3?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾3?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾4?̂?𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡  
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾3?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾4?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛾5?̂?𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 
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where ?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡, ?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 , ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, ?̂?𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡, ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡, ?̂?𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 are the loadings on risk factor, collected from 
the first step of the regression. 
III. Data 
We base our analysis on the U.S. equity market, due to its size, a large selection of vice stocks 
available, and the strong prevalence of U.S. data in previous research. Our data is divided in two 
distinct parts: price data pertaining to the U.S. equity market, as well as data on each of the FF3, 
CAR, and FF5 risk factors. In addition, we collect data on the one-month risk-free interest rate. 
1. Price data 
We examine price data on stocks from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ, the 
NYSE American, and the NYSE Arca stock exchanges. We use the U.S. Total Market Index from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to proxy for the constituent firms of these 
exchanges. As of March 2017, the index is made up of 3565 individual firms across all sizes and 
industries, and represents nearly the current entire investable equity universe in the U.S. The entire 
dataset is made up of monthly closing prices (or, when such observations are unavailable, average 
end-of-month bid/ask prices) for the period March 1987 to March 2017. We have chosen this period 
because a) a time span of 30 years gives a long-term perspective, allowing for comparing and 
contrasting periods, b) different economic cycles and market climates can be observed, c) the most 
recent developments are captured by the data. We use monthly data as it is the convention in the 
literature of our theoretical framework. 
  
In total, our raw data amounts to an approximate 830,000 observations of monthly stock prices. To 
eliminate survivorship bias,6 we sort the stocks on CRSP Permanent Company Numbers 
(PERMNO), a unique security identification number which remains the same through a security’s 
trading history. This is necessary due to the changes in composition (due to delisting, renaming, 
                                                          
6 The tendency for failed companies to be excluded from analysis because they no longer exist.  
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mergers, etc.) of the CRSP U.S. Total Market Index that occurs over time7. In total, we have price 
data from 5286 individual securities.   
  
The CRSP database provides raw, unadjusted prices, and needs to be adjusted for splits, reverse 
splits, dividends, and other events affecting the nominal market price of shares of stock. To obtain 
adjusted prices, adjustments are needed with the Cumulative Factor to Adjust Price (CFACPR), a 
factor maintained by and available through CRSP. Further, we compute monthly log returns8 from 
the monthly price data, winsorize the returns data outside the 1st and 99th percentiles, and drop all 
observations where no price is reported. The resulting dataset, which is used for our continued 
analysis, is summarized in Table 1. 
2. Risk factors and the risk-free rate 
In addition to price information from the U.S. stock markets, data on the FF3, CAR, and FF5 risk 
factors, as well as the risk-free interest rate for calculation of excess returns, is needed. We collect 
monthly data on the MKT, SMB, HML, MOM, RMW and CMA risk factors, as well as the one-
month U.S Treasury-bill (used to represent the one-month risk-free interest rate), from the online 
Kenneth R. French Data Library. All of these inputs are described by Table 2. 
IV. Method 
1. Creating the vice factor 
The first step of the process is to create our virtue and vice portfolios, which we subsequently use 
to calculate our monthly VICE factor. 
  
                                                          
7 For example, in a merger between firms, a completely new PERMNO is generated, even if an earlier ticker is kept.   
8 Log returns are used for the benefit of being symmetrical, i.e. a 50% price increase followed by a 50% price 
decrease gives a net effect of ±0%. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of individual firm returns 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the monthly returns on all firms in our sample. All inputs are in decimal 
form. 
 
  
   Return 
Mean 0.001281 
Standard Error  
of Mean 
0.000147 
Median 0.003645 
Standard  
Deviation 
0.161115 
Kurtosis 46.96787 
Skewness 1.015707 
Range 0.835696 
Minimum -0.43814 
Max 0.397559 
 14 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Properties of risk factors 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of all risk factors from the Fama and French Three-Factor Model, Carhart Four-Factor Model, and Fama and French Five-Factor 
Model. All inputs, except for Count, is presented in decimal form. 
 Mean 
Standard Error 
 of Mean 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Count 
MKT 0.0059 0.0024 0.0116 0.0445 2.8888 -0.9669 0.3459 -0.2324 0.1135 348 
SMB 0.0011 0.0016 0.0005 0.0306 5.2959 0.4569 0.3408 -0.1533 0.1875 348 
HML 0.0023 0.0016 0 0.0293 2.8176 0.123 0.24 -0.111 0.129 348 
MOM 0.0055 0.0025 0.0064 0.0474 11.4067 -1.5602 0.5272 -0.3439 0.1833 348 
RMW 0.0034 0.0014 0.003 0.0266 11.6502 -0.4506 0.3257 -0.1906 0.1351 348 
CMA 0.0028 0.0011 0.0012 0.0205 2.3894 0.5167 0.1644 -0.0688 0.0956 348 
RF 0.0027 0.0001 0.0028 0.0021 -1.107 0.1506 0.0079 0 0.0079 348 
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1.1 Portfolios 
Adhering to our definition of a vice stock, the vice portfolio (our long position) is made to consist 
of firms whose operations is based in our vice industries. We proxy for these industries by 1) 
collecting all firms held by the USA Mutuals Vice Fund from its inception on August 30, 2002 
until March 2017, 2) compiling firms from the Dow Jones U.S. Tobacco Index, Dow Jones U.S. 
Brewers Index, Dow Jones U.S. Distillers & Vintners Index, Dow Jones U.S. Gambling Index, and 
Dow Jones U.S. Defense Index, 3) hand-picking stocks in firearm and adult services companies, 
as these lack industry classifications of their own and are difficult to screen for. In total, our vice 
portfolio is constructed to contain 200 individual securities. We utilize equal weighting9, meaning 
that each firm constitutes 0.5% of the entire portfolio. Due to time constraints, we do not filter the 
fund holdings for firms not adhering to our definition of vice, which is discussed further in the 
section on limitations. The full list of firms is listed in Appendix B. 
 
To create our virtue portfolio (our short position), we must first define a virtue stock. As with our 
vice portfolio, we will use an industry-based approach in creating our virtue portfolio. Nonetheless, 
we feel that matching the vice industries listed above to virtue counterparts cannot be done without 
a high degree of subjectivity. For example, it could be reasonable to regard the healthcare industry 
as an opposite of the tobacco and/or alcohol industries, but such an analysis is not as straightforward 
for the adult services, gambling, or weapons and defense industries. To proxy for virtue stocks, we 
settle for using the healthcare and life science industries. We use the CRSP U.S. Health Care Index 
to proxy for these industries. We create the virtue portfolio out of the top 200 constituent firms. As 
with the vice portfolio, all firms are equally weighted. The full list of firms in the virtue portfolio 
is listed in Appendix C. 
 
Since the constituents of the CRSP U.S. Total Market are not constant over time (as firms on the 
NYSE, NASDAQ, NYSE American, and NYSE Arca stock exchanges become listed, delisted, 
merged, acquired, file for bankruptcy, etc.), our portfolios need to account for these changes in 
composition. We resample our vice and virtue portfolios at the end of each month. Thus, the  
                                                          
9 Given that most firms are large, and that we control for size through the SMB factor, we do not feel the need to use 
value weighting. 
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Figure 1 
No. of firms in portfolios 
Chart 1 plots the evolution of the number of firms in each of the vice and virtue portfolios across time.
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Table 3 
Characteristics of the vice and virtue portfolios 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the monthly returns of the vice and virtue portfolios. All inputs are in decimal 
form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Vice Virtue 
Mean 0.0056 0.0040 
Standard Error 
of Mean 
0.0028 0.0030 
Median 0.0135 0.0130 
Standard  
Deviation 
0.0515 0.0558 
Kurtosis 6.0709 3.2345 
Skewness -1.3890 -1.1065 
Range 0.5048 0.4308 
Minimum -0.3293 -0.3086 
Maximum 0.1755 0.1221 
Count 348 348 
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composition of our portfolios changes to match the constituent firms of the CRSP U.S. Total 
Market Index. Our portfolios are described by Figure 1 and Table 3. 
 
As shown by Figure 1, our vice and virtue portfolios are not necessarily equally populous at any 
point in time. We do not regard this to be a problem. However, when nearing the end of our 
examined time frame, the virtue portfolio also grows to contain far more firms than the vice 
portfolio. This is potentially problematic for our analysis, as we feel that a direct comparison 
between portfolios with 190 and 65 firms (as is the case in May 2016) is not entirely reliable. 
However, we argue that a larger problem would be insufficient diversification in the portfolios. 
Each of the portfolios are sufficiently diversified to make them independently viable for analysis. 
As shown by Statman (1987), 30 individual stocks are required for sufficient diversification to 
remove systematic risk. Both the vice and virtue portfolios contain at least 51 individual stocks at 
each time.  
 
At this stage, we are given an indication of the performance of vice and virtue stocks. The average 
monthly log return for vice stocks is 0.56% while virtue yields slightly less, 0.40%. Our vice 
portfolio also displays a lower volatility, indicating that vice stocks can earn better returns despite 
having lower risk. Observing the range and kurtosis of the portfolios, it seems as though the 
variance in vice stocks is, to a greater extent than in virtue stocks, explained by fewer extreme 
observations rather than more frequent, smaller deviations.   
1.2 Construction of the factor 
With our vice and virtue portfolios, we follow the methodology from Fama and French (1993, 
2015) and Carhart (1997) to create our VICE factor.  
 
𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡  =  𝑅𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑅𝑇𝑈𝐸,𝑡 
 
Where 𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 is our risk factor for vice, 𝑅𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸,𝑡 is the monthly return of the vice portfolio at month 
t, and 𝑅𝑉𝐼𝑅𝑇𝑈𝐸,𝑡 is the monthly return of the virtue portfolio at month t. This is similar to how 
factors are defined in the papers of our theoretical background. 
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2. Testing for multicollinearity 
To research our second hypothesis, we need to examine whether vice is indeed a determinant of 
asset prices. With our VICE factor created, we run the following regressions: 
 
𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
 
In statistical terms, this is a simple test of multicollinearity. In economic terms, we are attempting 
to see whether the effect of vice is priced by the other risk factors. Under our second hypothesis, 
these models generate significant alphas, meaning that differences in return between vice and 
virtue portfolios are not completely explained by the other factors of the models. The signs of 
alphas (positive/negative) will also give some indication as to whether vice can generate superior 
returns or not. 
 
To complement this test, and to further examine the interplay between risk factors, we look at the 
pairwise correlations between all of our risk factors. 
3. Fama and MacBeth regressions 
The second part of our thesis consists of examining a potential premium from exposure to vice, 
using the methodology from Fama and MacBeth (1973). The Fama and MacBeth regression is a 
straightforward method of finding factor loadings on returns, as well as premia for risk factors. We 
estimate the following regressions: 
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𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡+𝜖𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
 
Each of these regressions will be estimated with a sliding window, where we examine a period of 
5 years at a time, sliding the window one month forward after each regression. The reason is that 
we do not expect betas to be static over time, but rather highly subject to change.10 
 
Then, for each month in our sample, we run a cross-sectional regression to estimate the following 
equations: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾3?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾4?̂?𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡  
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾3?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾4?̂?𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾5?̂?𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾3?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾4?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛾5?̂?𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛾6?̂?𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑡  
  
where 𝑅𝑡 is the monthly stock returns at time t, and ?̂?𝑀𝐾𝑇, ?̂?𝑆𝑀𝐵, ?̂?𝐻𝑀𝐿, ?̂?𝑀𝑂𝑀, ?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑊, ?̂?𝐶𝑀𝐴, and 
?̂?𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸 are the loadings on factors from each risk factor, collected from the first step of the 
regression. The premium for each risk factor, including the premium on our constructed VICE 
factor, is found by calculating the mean of the gammas for each risk factor. 
 
                                                          
10 Preliminary results, where we attempted a static beta approach with a single time series regression, confirmed this 
to be a more appropriate method. Without the sliding window, highly illogical results were produced (such as 
negative market premia across models, and other factors showing consistently negative premia. 
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Due to time constraints, we will limit the Fama and Macbeth regressions to using monthly returns 
of the constituent firms in the S&P 500 index, rather than running these regressions for every stock 
in our full sample.  
V. Results  
In this section, we report the result from the methodology described in the previous section. First, 
we report our findings regarding multicollinearity and the interplay between VICE and the other 
risk factors. Second, we show the results from our Fama and MacBeth regressions. All tests are 
done using either Python or Stata.  
1. Multicollinearity and interplay between factors 
We first run regressions to examine the economic significance of vice as a determinant of firm 
returns. This test of multicollinearity is summarized in Table 4. 
 
Regressing VICE against the risk factors from the FF3, CAR, and FF5 gives insignificant alphas in 
each case. The effect of vice on individual firm returns seems to be explained by the other factors. 
This is contrary to our hypothesis, which states that vice does indeed play a role in determining the 
return of stocks. In addition, the alpha for FF5 is negative, signaling that vice stocks may not 
outperform the market. These results, taken collectively, would indicate that a) vice does not seem 
to generate superior returns for firms, b) our vice factor is priced by the other factors, signaling that 
vice, in and of itself, is not a determinant of stock prices at all.  
 
For FF3 and CAR, SMB and HML show significance, which is likely to play a role in explaining 
the insignificant alpha for VICE in these models. In the FF5 case, MKT is significant, and likely to 
be one cause for VICE’s insignificant alpha. None of the other factors seem to be independently 
significant when testing for multicollinearity with FF5, however. 𝑅2 for each of the models are 
relatively low, meaning that much of the variability in VICE is left unexplained by the variability 
in the other factors. In sum, the risk factors from FF3, CAR, and FF5 models seem to be able to 
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explain the effects of VICE on firm returns (as indicated by the insignificant alphas) but not the 
variability in VICE itself (as indicated by the low 𝑅2.) 
 
Table 4 
Results from tests of multicollinearity 
Table 4 displays coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the regression where our vice factor is regressed on 
risk factors from each of the FF3, CAR, and FF5 models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  FF3 CAR FF5 
    
MKT 0.0588 0.0507 0.105*** 
  (1.58) (1.32) (2.60) 
SMB -0.131** -0.129** -0.0004 
  (-2.45) (-2.40) (-0.01) 
HML 0.514*** 0.502*** 0.465*** 
  (9.21) (8.72) (6.28) 
RMW     0.386*** 
      (5.30) 
CMA     -0.0991 
      (-0.93) 
MOM   -0.0297   
    (-0.84)   
Constant 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0011 
  (0.14) (0.28) (-0.70) 
Observations 348 348 348 
R-squared 0.221 0.222 0.286 
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The correlation between different factors are displayed in Table 5. While not showing tendencies 
to co-vary with the broader market, our vice factor displays some correlation with other factors. 
We suspect that it is these levels of correlation that renders the alpha insignificant in our simple 
tests of multicollinearity. Independently, not the least is this the case with HML (which was also 
reported as having significance in explaining the effects of VICE on firm returns) and RMW, both 
showing correlation with VICE. A possible interpretation is that the firms of our vice portfolio 
have characteristics of high book-to-market equity and robust operating profits.  
 
Table 5 
Correlations between risk factors 
Table 5 displays pairwise correlation factors for the risk factors from each of the models used, with the significance 
level of each correlation coefficient in brackets.  
  MKT SMB MOM HML RMW  CMA VICE 
MKT 1              
                 
SMB 0.2084 1            
  (0.0001)              
                 
MOM -0.1987 0.0152 1          
  (0.0001) (0.7711)            
                 
HML -0.196 -0.1144 -0.2071 1        
  (0.0002) (0.028) (0.0001)          
                 
RMW -0.3787 -0.4603 0.0811 0.3467 1      
  (0) (0) (0.1198) (0)        
                 
CMA -0.3725 -0.0354 0.0335 0.6521 0.1954  1   
  (0) (0.4976) (0.5212) (0) (0.0002)      
                 
VICE -0.0401 -0.1696 -0.1475 0.452 0.3914  0.2165 1 
  (0.4556) (0.0015) (0.0058) (0) (0)  (0)   
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2. Fama and MacBeth Regressions 
2.1 Time Series Regressions 
For each of our models, we run separate sliding window time series regressions, one for each stock, 
where individual firm returns are regressed on the risk factors from our augmented FF3, CAR, and 
FF5 models. From these regressions, we obtain monthly loadings on factors from each of the risk 
factors. The main purpose of these is to make possible the calculation of factor premia (for which 
results are reported in the coming section.)  
2.2 Cross-Sectional Regressions 
For each of our models, we run separate cross-sectional regressions, one for every month, where 
monthly returns for all firms are regressed on the coefficients from the first step of the Fama and 
MacBeth regressions. By averaging the coefficients for each factor, we obtain the premia for that 
particular factor. Premia for each risk factor across the models are reported in Table 6.  
 
While FF3 and FF5 generates positive premia for vice, with respective values of 0.0003 and 0.0014, 
the CAR model shows a vice discount of -0.0009. Thus, while the fact that two out of three models 
show positive premia may be indicative of vice outperforming in the market, we deem our results 
to be inconclusive as to whether vice stocks have a true premium or not. This is inconsistent with 
our hypothesis that vice has a premium and higher expected returns, but consistent with some 
previous studies that also fail to find outperformance by vice. For example, Lobe and Walkshäusl 
(2016), who adopted a methodology similar to ours, also fail to find conclusive evidence that vice 
(or, for that matter, virtue) performs better in the equity market.   
 
While inconsistent with our hypothesis, finding conflicting results is not entirely surprising, since 
our basic tests of multicollinearity indicated a) that vice stocks may not yield higher returns (given 
the one instance with a negative alpha), b) that vice may not be a determinant of stock returns at 
all. Furthermore, there are other noteworthy premia in our results of the Fama and MacBeth 
regression. For FF5, we observe negative premia for SMB, HML, and CMA. On average, we would 
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expect all premia across models to be positive.11 These anomalies indicate that our findings may 
be faulty, and we therefore address our results further in our robustness check as well as our 
discussion of limitations. 
 
Table 6 
Premia for risk factors across models 
Table 6 reports premia for all risk factors for each of the Fama and French Three-Factor Model (FF3), Carhart Four-
Factor Model (CAR), and Fama and French Five-Factor Model (FF5). Premia are found by averaging the coefficients 
in the second step of the Fama and MacBeth regression. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
11 Based on the observation that firms constituting the long position in each risk factor do indeed tend to earn higher 
returns than their short position counterparts. 
  FF3 CAR FF5 
MKT 0.0008 0.0008 0.0013 
SMB 0.0006 0.0000 -0.0040 
HML 0.0008 0.0024 -0.0015 
MOM   0.0065   
RMW     0.0056 
CMA     -0.0010 
VICE 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0014 
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VI. Robustness 
1. Examining market betas 
In an attempt to find whether our price data is in any way flawed, we compare price data from 
our CRSP sample to that of a different source. For a single stock,12 we regress monthly returns on 
the risk factors from FF3, CAR, and FF5. This is done with data from both our own sample and 
from Yahoo Finance. We are examining a) whether coefficients are the same (or close to be the 
same) for both data sources, which would indicate that our data is correctly gathered, b) whether 
coefficients seem plausible in both cases. The results from these regressions are summarized in 
Table 7. 
As shown below, the results are highly consistent across data sources, with all coefficients and t-
statistics being close to identical for the CRSP and Yahoo data. This indicates that no problems 
are present in our data collection method. The fact that most coefficients are negative (with the 
obvious exception of for MKT) may indicate that the examined firm has characteristics typical of 
firms in the short position of each risk factor – that is, large market capitalization, low book-to-
market equity, negative momentum, weak operating profits, and aggressive investment policies. 
VII. Analysis 
Our hypotheses were that a) vice, in and of itself, is a determinant of individual firm returns, b) 
vice stocks carry premia. We find no evidence that allow us to reject them. However, the results of 
our paper indicate that what role vice is assumed to play in explaining returns is captured by other 
risk factors. Our results are also inconclusive as to whether vice stocks have higher expected returns 
than the market. In this section, we analyze our results, what might be the cause to prevent us from 
confirming our hypotheses, and provide narrative on the limitations of our research. 
 
                                                          
12 For its size and long history of trading, we have chosen IBM. 
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Table 7 
Comparison of regressions between two data sources 
Table 8 reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) for risk factors regressed on monthly returns for IBM during 
our sample period. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
    CRSP       Yahoo   
  FF3 CAR FF5   FF3 CAR FF5 
                
MKT 0.948*** 0.835*** 0.883***   0.948*** 0.834*** 0.883*** 
  (11.91) (10.57) (9.857)   (11.91) (10.57) (9.861) 
SMB -0.325*** -0.296*** -0.372***   -0.325*** -0.296*** -0.372*** 
  (-2.867) (-2.719) (-2.985)   (-2.870) (-2.722) (-2.986) 
HML -0.273** -0.435*** -0.112   -0.271** -0.433*** -0.112 
  (-2.333) (-3.758) (-0.696)   (-2.322) (-3.749) (-0.696) 
RMW     -0.197       -0.196 
      (-1.220)       (-1.213) 
CMA     -0.275       -0.273 
      (-1.171)       (-1.160) 
MOM   -0.409***       -0.410***   
    (-5.638)       (-5.646)   
Constant -0.000667 0.00247 0.000830   -0.000668 0.00247 0.000818 
  (-0.195) (0.743) (0.234)   (-0.195) (0.744) (0.231) 
                
R-squared 0.314 0.371 0.319   0.314 0.371 0.319 
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Firstly, it is possible that we get inconclusive results because the logic behind our initial hypotheses 
is flawed. We reason that an increased environmental, social and governance (ESG) focus leads to 
divestment from vice stocks. This is assumed to lower the demand of stock, which lowers the share 
price, which in turn leads to undervaluation in relation to a firm’s economic fundamentals. We 
must allow for the possibility that this reasoning is faulty. It may instead be that real demand for 
products and services offered by vice firms is decreasing, making such firms less profitable, 
depreciating share prices as a result. This would not increase the expected return of such firms. 
Since responsible investing principles has seen an increase in appeal during recent years, this effect 
can be assumed to be more pronounced the closer we get to present time. 
 
Secondly, there is great difficulty in creating a risk factor that fully captures the differences between 
vice and virtue. As we mention in the introduction, what constitutes a vice and a virtue differs 
greatly not only across cultures, but also between individuals. It is helpful to consider a spectrum 
that stretches from fully vicious to fully virtuous. While some firms may be placed at either 
extreme, many fall somewhere in the middle. For example, it is problematic to gauge the level of 
vice in a firm that on one hand produces commercial aircraft, but on the other hand produces 
weapon systems. These inherent limitations make it difficult for us to appreciate the accuracy of 
our vice factor, and to measure the premium in vice stocks as well. 
 
Another considerable limitation to our methodology is the way that we construct the vice and virtue 
portfolios. Firstly, the vice portfolio contains some firms that do not fit into our definition of vice, 
such as Netflix, Inc., Avis Budget Group, Inc., and Applied Biosystems, Inc. There are also firms 
that have mixed operations, such as Boeing Co.13 Replicating the results of our study with updated 
holdings, that more closely adheres to our definition of vice, is likely to generate different findings. 
We do maintain, however, that the portfolio is representative of our definition of vice, since these 
outlier firms are limited in number. Secondly, we use only healthcare and life science firms to 
proxy for virtue. In reality, firms from many sectors could be included in a virtue portfolio. We 
settle for using only the healthcare and life science industries as we regard them clear-cut cases of 
industries belonging to the virtuous end of the vice-virtue spectrum discussed above.14 It should 
                                                          
13 Due to time constraints, we have not adjusted the holdings accordingly. 
14 Again, time constraints prevented us from constructing a more representative portfolio.  
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also be mentioned that healthcare firms may not always be regarded as virtuous, since profits are 
made from illness. A similar argument is made for the biotech sector in Fabozzi et al. (2008), who 
chooses to label the biotech sector as a vice industry. For future research, we suggest redoing the 
analysis where a more diversified virtue portfolio is constructed.  
VIII. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine a 30-year period to find whether vice plays a role in determining returns 
of individual firms on the U.S. stock markets. By regressing a monthly vice factor against the Fama 
and French Three-Factor Model (FF3), Carhart Four-Factor Model (CAR), and Fama and French 
Five-Factor Model (FF5), we attempt to find whether effects from vice are already captured by 
other risk factors. We find no evidence that vice can be expected to affect stock prices, but rather, 
that expected effects from vice are priced by the other factors. What effect we expected vice to 
have on firm returns appears to be sufficiently explained by returns in the market, as well as firm-
specific market capitalization, book-to-market equity, stock price momentum, operating profits, 
and investment policies. On the other hand, our analysis does not lead us to conclude that either 
the Fama and French or Carhart risk factors explain the variability in our vice factor. 
 
By supplementing each of FF3, CAR, and FF5 with a constructed vice factor, we create augmented 
models used to examine whether vice stocks are associated with a premium. This is done through 
estimating three separate Fama and MacBeth regressions, one for each model. FF3 and FF5 
generate positive premia for vice, while CAR indicates that vice has a discount. These findings 
prevent us from either confirming or rejecting our hypothesis of vice having a premium.     
 
Despite not reaching any specific conclusions with regards to premia for vice stocks, we feel that 
our work contributes to research on the subject of vice and virtue stocks. We have laid groundwork 
for further discussion on the subject of pursuing both financial and non-financial goals through 
investing. If investors can maintain the same risk adjusted return despite divestment from certain 
industries, it is implied that investors can pursue non-financial goals while still achieving 
satisfactory returns. Furthermore, our thesis contributes to existing research within this field by 
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adopting performing the Fama and Macbeth analysis, by examining the entire U.S. equity market, 
and by adopting a long-term view, with a total of 30 years of data.  
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X. Appendices  
Appendix A: Description of risk factors 
Below are detailed descriptions of the creation of the risk factors from the Fama and French Three-
Factor Model, the Carhar Four-Factor Model, and the Fama and French Five-Factor Model. 
 
SMB is a measure of the difference in average returns between small and big firms (market 
capitalization). It is created from corresponding measures where firms are sorted on different levels 
of firm size, book-to-market equity, operating profits, and investment policies.  
 
𝑆𝑀𝐵 = 1/3(𝑆𝑀𝐵(B/M) + 𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝑂𝑃) +  𝑆𝑀𝐵(𝐼𝑁𝑉),  
where 
𝑆𝑀𝐵(B/M) = 1/3(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)
− 1/3(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ), 
 
𝑆𝑀𝐵(OP) = 1/3(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘)
− 1/3(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘), 
 
𝑆𝑀𝐵(INV) = 1/3(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒)
− 1/3(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒) 
 
HML is a measure of the difference in average returns between firms with high and low book-to-
market equity. High book-to-market companies are also called value stocks and low book-to-
market companies are regarded as growth stocks.  
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𝐻𝑀𝐿 = 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)
− 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) 
 
MOM is a measure of the difference in average returns at time between firms with positive and 
negative momentum. Positive momentum is defined as positive 12-month average return, while 
negative momentum is defined as negative 12-month average return. 
 
𝑀𝑂𝑀 = 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ)
− 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑤 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐿𝑜𝑤) 
 
RMW is a measure of the difference in average returns between firms with robust and weak 
operating profits, RMW is seen as the profitability factor.  
 
𝑅𝑀𝑊 = 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡)
− 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘) 
 
CMA is a measure of the difference in average returns between firms with conservative and 
aggressive investment strategies.  
 
𝐶𝑀𝐴 = 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒)
− 1/2(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒) 
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Appendix B: Vice firms 
PERMNO Company Name PERMNO Company Name 
10145 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC 64135 W M S INDUSTRIES INC 
11891 M G M RESORTS INTERNATIONAL 79795 AMERISTAR CASINOS INC 
12052 GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP 86249 CENTRAL EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTN CORP 
12060 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 79712 LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP 
12570 I T T INC 76999 T H Q INC 
12623 HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDS INC 85838 NEW FRONTIER MEDIA INC 
13267 CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORP 12140 GOODRICH CORP 
13502 ENGILITY HLDGS INC NEW 87762 CRYPTOLOGIC LTD 
13610 OLIN CORP 86744 PRIVATE MEDIA GROUP INC 
13901 ALTRIA GROUP INC 76372 INTEGRAL SYSTEMS INC 
13970 TRUETT HURST INC 84280 L 1 IDENTITY SOLUTIONS INC 
14141 SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTL CORP 53815 PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES INC 
14252 GAMING & LEISURE PROPERTIES INC 76218 PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES INC 
14304 CAESARS ACQUISITION CO 78953 APPLIED SIGNAL TECHNOLOGY 
14759 ADVANCED DRAINAGE SYSTEMS INC 79365 RINO INTERNATIONAL CORP 
15168 VISTA OUTDOOR INC 79641 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC 
15331 INTERNATIONAL GAME TECH PLC 87005 YOUBET COM 
16001 PINNACLE ENTERTAINMENT INC NEW 79850 PROGRESSIVE GAMING INTL CORP 
16083 TURNING POINT BRANDS INC 15077 U S T INC 
16276 ADVANSIX INC 27713 APPLIED BIOSYSTEMS INC DEL 
16555 UNIVERSAL CORPORATION 59184 ANHEUSER BUSCH COS INC 
16593 NEW AGE BEVERAGES CORP 82613 SECURE COMPUTING CORP 
17523 SPARTON CORP 65226 D R S TECHNOLOGIES INC 
17778 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DEL 86404 IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC 
17830 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 82710 PYRAMID BREWERIES INC 
18091 CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 24046 CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS INC 
19561 BOEING CO 89274 METAL STORM LTD 
20512 CACI INTERNATIONAL INC 76090 HARRAHS ENTERTAINMENT INC 
21178 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 41371 UNITED INDUSTRIAL CORP 
23579 TEXTRON INC 77392 POLYMEDICA CORP 
24766 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 79192 STATION CASINOS INC 
24942 RAYTHEON CO 80831 MOVIE GALLERY INC 
25487 AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC 84616 GUITAR CENTER INC 
25582 HARRIS CORP 75721 ABATIX CORP 
29867 ALLIANCE ONE INTERNATIONAL INC 88279 B A S F AG 
29938 BROWN FORMAN CORP 83189 ARMOR HOLDINGS INC 
29946 BROWN FORMAN CORP 41444 ABLEST INC 
32678 HEICO CORP NEW 84775 GALLAHER GROUP PLC 
34497 NATIONAL PRESTO INDS INC 76171 H C A INC NEW 
36281 SEABOARD CORP 80573 KERZNER INTERNATIONAL LTD 
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42614 MOOG INC 77803 GTECH HOLDINGS CORP 
50788 ESTERLINE TECHNOLOGIES CORP 47897 KIRIN BREWERY LTD 
51263 MANITOWOC CO INC 85213 SCHEID VINEYARDS INC 
59248 MOLSON COORS BREWING CO 86355 D H B INDUSTRIES INC 
59504 BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PLC 87581 ENGINEERED SUPPORT SYS INC 
61567 HEXCEL CORP NEW 53946 STERLING CAPITAL CORP 
61807 MOOG INC 10108 SUNGARD DATA SYSTEMS INC 
64899 CONSTELLATION BRANDS INC 86447 CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT INC 
69796 CONSTELLATION BRANDS INC 89260 UNITED DEFENSE INDUSTRIES INC 
70033 HARLEY DAVIDSON INC 16715 STANDARD COMMERCIAL CORP 
71985 SPARTAN MOTORS INC 89223 CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 
73219 STURM RUGER & CO INC 85620 METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC NEW 
75233 VECTOR GROUP LTD 75684 NETEGRITY INC 
75828 ELECTRONIC ARTS INC 83563 SWEDISH MATCH CO 
76138 B E AEROSPACE INC 86088 BLUE RHINO CORP 
76477 ORBITAL A T K INC 89346 TRAVELERS PPTY CASUALTY CORP NEW 
76592 DIAGEO PLC 87470 PREMIER BANCORP INC PA 
77928 COMPANIA CERVECERIAS UNIDAS S A 79786 ATLANTIC PREMIUM BRANDS LTD 
79026 CHURCHILL DOWNS INC 79193 SIGNAL TECHNOLOGY CORP 
79338 SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORP 82653 DISC GRAPHICS INC 
79507 MONARCH CASINO & RESORT INC 85927 SECURITY ASSOCIATES INC 
79678 ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC 52740 COLONIAL COMMERCIAL CORP 
79758 BOYD GAMING CORP 77219 HEALTHCARE INTEGRATED SVCS INC 
80563 PENN NATIONAL GAMING INC 81694 GLOBAL CAPITAL PARTNERS INC 
80955 WILLAMETTE VALLEY VINYDS INC 65453 UNITED DOMINION INDUSTRIES LTD 
81049 VINA CONCHA Y TORO S A 85658 RAYTHEON CO 
82176 CRAFT BREW ALLIANCE INC 79640 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES INC 
82515 POOL CORP 11522 SUMMIT TECHNOLOGY INC 
82518 RCI HOSPITALITY HOLDINGS INC 83341 TRAVELERS PPTY CASUALTY CORP 
82634 BOSTON BEER INC 84771 APPLE ORTHODONTIX INC 
82649 SCHWEITZER MAUDUIT INTL INC 18374 HONEYWELL INC 
83443 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DEL 12539 AMERICAN BANKERS INS GROUP INC 
84062 BJS RESTAURANTS INC 80736 ROCK BOTTOM RESTAURANTS INC 
84398 SPDR S & P 500 E T F TRUST 33312 SUNAMERICA INC 
85254 AMBEV SA 76829 MONEY STORE INC 
85488 O S I SYSTEMS INC 82776 I T T CORP NEV 
85945 HEICO CORP NEW 82808 NOR WESTER BREWING INC 
86021 L 3 TECHNOLOGIES INC 88605 HEALTH IMAGES INC 
86946 REYNOLDS AMERICAN INC 79495 GARMENT GRAPHICS INC 
87825 UTSTARCOM HOLDINGS CORP 65234 DIAGNOSTIC RETRIEVAL SYS INC 
88392 EMBRAER S A 76640 VIGORO CORP 
88534 INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS & SUPRT INC 35529 PRATT & LAMBERT UNITED INC 
88668 MONSANTO CO NEW 69104 SAMSON ENERGY CO LTD PARTNERSHIP 
88837 GARMIN LTD 68208 A O I COAL COMPANY 
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89014 ROCKWELL COLLINS INC 12120 ASSIX INTERNATIONAL INC 
89031 TASER INTERNATIONAL INC 68486 HEALTHCARE INTERNATIONAL INC 
89307 MANTECH INTERNATIONAL CORP 75004 ALLSTAR INNS L P 
89393 NETFLIX INC 68056 MONARCH CAPITAL CORP 
58560 AMERICAN SCIENCE & ENGR INC 11640 POSEIDON POOLS OF AMERICA INC 
42140 PINNACLE ENTERTAINMENT INC 69729 M G M U A COMMMUNICATIONS 
63830 PRECISION CASTPARTS CORP 66229 AMBRIT INC 
87277 MARTHA STEWART LVNG OMNIMEDIA IN 42729 EAGLE CLOTHES INC 
87816 ROCK CREEK PHARMACEUTICALS INC 10153 ALLIS CHALMERS CORP 
45277 INTERNATIONAL GAME TECHNOLOGY 11843 ALLECO INC 
76139 ORBITAL SCIENCES CORP 86450 CATALYST ENERGY DEV CORP 
83529 MULTIMEDIA GAMES HOLDING CO INC 23421 STEVENS J P & CO INC 
38149 BALLY TECHNOLOGIES INC 79901 VAC TEC SYSTEMS INC 
78147 M T R GAMING GROUP 50737 BROCKWAY INC NY 
10225 BEAM INC 60716 SPECTRA PHYSICS INC 
78200 S H F L ENTERTAINMENT INC 19036 BRAINTECH INC 
 
Appendix C: Virtue firms 
PERMNO Company Name PERMNO Company Name 
10180 AKORN INC 75694 BIO TECHNE CORP 
10200 REPLIGEN CORP 75860 IMMUNOGEN INC 
10860 ORASURE TECHNOLOGIES INC 75976 NEOGEN CORP 
10966 AXOGEN INC 76095 HOLOGIC INC 
11547 CONMED CORP 76392 MERIT MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC 
11552 CELGENE CORP 76591 QUIDEL CORP 
11587 ATRION CORP 76614 REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
11600 DENTSPLY SIRONA INC 76661 IONIS PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
11636 HERON THERAPEUTICS INC 76709 I D E X X LABORATORIES INC 
12062 LABORATORY CORP AMERICA HLDGS 76736 ALKERMES PLC 
12413 ZOGENIX INC 76744 VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
12583 PACIRA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 76788 TIVITY HEALTH INC 
12587 WRIGHT MEDICAL GROUP N V 76837 HAEMONETICS CORP MASS 
12622 H C A HOLDINGS INC 76841 BIOGEN INC 
12919 HORIZON PHARMA PLC 77182 PERRIGO CO PLC 
13105 ACADIA HEALTHCARE CO INC 77274 GILEAD SCIENCES INC 
13107 CLOVIS ONCOLOGY INC 77279 ABAXIS INC 
13410 SUPERNUS PHARMACEUTICALS INC 77447 I C U MEDICAL INC 
13456 TESARO INC 77605 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 
13543 GLOBUS MEDICAL INC 77629 U S PHYSICAL THERAPY INC 
13621 PUMA BIOTECHNOLOGY INC 77649 STERIS PLC 
13643 INTERCEPT PHARMACEUTICALS INC 77668 EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING CO 
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13721 ABBVIE INC 78034 PATTERSON COMPANIES INC 
13788 ZOETIS INC 78081 LIGAND PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
13825 ENANTA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 78156 H M S HOLDINGS CORP 
13911 QUINTILES TRANSNATIONAL HLDGS IN 78756 ORTHOFIX INTERNATIONAL N V 
13924 EPIZYME INC 78916 ALLERGAN PLC 
13940 PORTOLA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 79637 UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES INC 
13947 BLUEBIRD BIO INC 79906 INCYTE CORP 
13954 ESPERION THERAPEUTICS INC NEW 80539 NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS 
13967 P T C THERAPEUTICS INC 80622 DICKINSON HOLDING CORP 
14008 AMGEN INC 80795 AMEDISYS INC 
14011 MALLINCKRODT PLC 81736 RESMED INC 
14044 AGIOS PHARMACEUTICALS INC 82179 INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES HLDNGS CORP 
14072 INTREXON CORP 82272 MEDNAX INC 
14160 FOUNDATION MEDICINE INC 82307 DAVITA INC 
14176 ACCELERON PHARMA INC 82508 MYRIAD GENETICS INC 
14198 ANALOGIC CORP 82567 OPKO HEALTH INC 
14238 AERIE PHARMACEUTICALS INC 82581 SCHEIN HENRY INC 
14257 MACROGENICS INC 82651 WATERS CORP 
14359 XENCOR INC 82702 IMPAX LABORATORIES INC 
14432 INTRA CELLULAR THERAPIES INC 83111 ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
14436 ULTRAGENYX PHARMACEUTICALS INC 83534 NEUROCRINE BIOSCIENCES INC 
14440 RETROPHIN INC 83950 SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
14459 INOGEN INC 84373 QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC 
14467 REVANCE THERAPEUTICS INC 85002 SAREPTA THERAPEUTICS INC 
14674 THERAVANCE BIOPHARMA INC 85675 ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORP 
14707 RADIUS HEALTH INC 86899 LIFEPOINT HEALTH INC 
14763 CATALENT INC 87006 UNITED THERAPEUTICS CORP 
14828 SAGE THERAPEUTICS INC 87056 BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC 
14836 INTERSECT E N T INC 87657 EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORP 
14871 LOXO ONCOLOGY INC 87789 LUMINEX CORP 
14941 HALYARD HEALTH INC 88159 EXELIXIS INC 
14991 ATARA BIOTHERAPEUTICS INC 88195 SANGAMO THERAPEUTICS INC 
15046 NEVRO CORP 88281 CHARLES RIVER LABS INTL INC 
15065 FIBROGEN INC 88351 INSMED INC 
15079 PRA HEALTH SCIENCES INC 88352 INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC 
15183 SPARK THERAPEUTICS INC 88421 ARENA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
15222 LION BIOTECHNOLOGIES INC 88436 ENDO INTERNATIONAL PLC 
15284 BLUEPRINT MEDICINES CORP 88446 ILLUMINA INC 
15454 GLAUKOS CORP 88504 BRUKER CORP 
15585 TELADOC INC 88545 MEDICINES COMPANY 
15630 AIMMUNE THERAPEUTICS INC 88790 ARRAY BIOPHARMA INC 
15638 GLOBAL BLOOD THERAPEUTICS INC 88845 AETNA INC NEW 
15694 PENUMBRA INC 88860 ALIGN TECHNOLOGY INC 
15779 CYTOMX THERAPEUTICS INC 88863 EXACT SCIENCES CORP 
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15788 MYOKARDIA INC 88949 SEATTLE GENETICS INC 
15789 NOVOCURE LTD 89036 NATUS MEDICAL INC 
15934 AVEXIS INC 89070 ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS INC 
15937 EDITAS MEDICINE INC 89110 OMNICELL INC 
16386 IRHYTHM TECHNOLOGIES INC 89179 ANTHEM INC 
16543 VAREX IMAGING CORP 89269 CENTENE CORP DEL 
16562 ANAPTYSBIO INC 89781 MOLINA HEALTHCARE INC 
19393 BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO 90011 MAGELLAN HEALTH INC 
20482 ABBOTT LABORATORIES 90029 DYNAVAX TECHNOLOGIES CORP 
21936 PFIZER INC 90125 CORCEPT THERAPEUTICS INC 
22111 JOHNSON & JOHNSON 90177 ACADIA PHARMACEUTICALS 
22752 MERCK & CO INC NEW 90178 ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
22825 CANTEL MEDICAL CORP 90188 NUVASIVE INC 
27043 VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC 90233 MOMENTA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
27887 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 90272 WELLCARE HEALTH PLANS INC 
39642 BECTON DICKINSON & CO 90423 THERAVANCE INC 
41292 HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP INC 90436 HALOZYME THERAPEUTICS INC 
43757 IMMUNOMEDICS INC 90564 PRESTIGE BRANDS HOLDINGS INC 
44329 TELEFLEX INC 90664 DEXCOM INC 
48653 HUMANA INC 90734 L H C GROUP 
50876 LILLY ELI & CO 90957 NXSTAGE MEDICAL INC 
52337 TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 90988 BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING INC 
52716 HILL ROM HOLDINGS INC 91086 ACORDA THERAPEUTICS INC 
60097 MEDTRONIC PLC 91571 EMERGENT BIOSOLUTIONS INC 
60186 OWENS & MINOR INC NEW 92040 AMICUS THERAPEUTICS INC 
61508 BIO RAD LABORATORIES INC 92050 INSULET CORP 
62092 THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 92096 JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS PLC 
62498 WEST PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES INC 92220 MASIMO CORP 
64186 CIGNA CORP 92432 ENSIGN GROUP INC 
65541 COOPER COMPANIES INC 92587 BIOTELEMETRY INC 
69550 MYLAN N V 92655 UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC 
73139 STRYKER CORP 93035 SELECT MEDICAL HOLDINGS CORP 
75107 ABIOMED INC 93264 IRONWOOD PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
 
